Penn State Law Review

Volume 124

Issue 1

Article 4

2019

Subversive Science
Dov Fox
University of San Diego Law School, dovfox@sandiego.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/pslr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Fox, Dov (2019) "Subversive Science," Penn State Law Review: Vol. 124 : Iss. 1 , Article 4.
Available at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/pslr/vol124/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Penn State Law Review by an authorized editor of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information,
please contact ram6023@psu.edu.

ART 4 - SUBVERSIVE SCIENCE (DO NOT DELETE)

10/12/2019 11:59 AM

Subversive Science
Dov Fox
ABSTRACT
This Article introduces the phenomenon of subversive science,
reveals its operation in modern American society, and analyzes its
implications for law and policy amidst calls to defund or repress
controversial lines of inquiry. Existing debates center on whether cuttingedge science casts doubt on abstract ideals that animate our legal system,
from racial equality to criminal responsibility. This focus misses the
deeper and more practical danger that lies in how citizens misperceive and
misapply these ideals in election and trial decisions. What makes certain
science “subversive” is its power to shake the public’s faith in those
democratic cornerstones.
Emerging bodies of psychology research show that presenting voters
with genomic studies of group differences makes them less willing to fund
early education for the underprivileged. In a similar vein, brain imaging
studies—that predict whether people will commit certain acts before they
even intend to—can lead jurors to question free will and acquit guilty
defendants. Neither scientific illiteracy nor cultural worldviews explains
away these results, defying the orthodoxy that individuals conform their
views on contested matters to their command of the facts or values that
define their identities.
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Reframing the debate about subversive science means targeting the
transmission of knowledge, rather than its production. I advance a range
of systematic reforms to combat the alternative facts and cognitive bias
through novel forms of engagement in congressional hearings, classroom
lessons, and courtroom testimony.
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INTRODUCTION
“Let the facts be known as they are, and the law will sprout from
the seed and turn its branches toward the light.”
— Benjamin Cardozo, What Medicine Can Do for Law1
“There are various things we simply ought not to know.”
— Nicholas Rescher, Forbidden Knowledge2

Science can liberate the law or corrupt it. Some of these influences
are familiar. Sound forensics can help put criminals away, while flawed
tools and tests can deprive the innocent of their liberty. More subtly,
however, scientific discoveries can force us to rethink the ideals that our
legal system accepts as true: Do genetic studies of intelligence imperil
norms of group equality, as when states discriminate on the basis of sex or
race?3 Does brain imaging erode the assumption of responsibility for
action that’s subject to civil suit or prosecution?4 Might neuroscience
undermine the mind-body dualism that distinguishes mental phenomena
from physical ones in doctrines from tort harm to criminal intent?5
Scientific inquiries that carry this power to shake core assumptions
in the law have historically gone by the name of “forbidden knowledge.”6
But the moniker is misleading. There is nothing especially menacing about
knowledge on its own, separate and apart from why it is pursued or how it
is used. Awareness or understanding of some subject can be troubling only
when those facts are sought for bad reasons, or when such data are put to
bad effects.7 Knowledge itself, however forbidding, does not plausibly

1. Benjamin Cardozo, What Medicine Can Do for Law, 5 BULL. N.Y. ACAD.
MED. 581, 583 (1929).
2. NICHOLAS RESCHER, FORBIDDEN KNOWLEDGE 9 (1987).
3. See, e.g., Mark A. Rothstein, Legal Conceptions of Equality in the Genomic Age,
25 LAW & INEQ. 429, 455–62 (2007).
4. See, e.g., Uri Maoz & Gideon Yaffe, What Does Recent Neuroscience Tell Us
About Criminal Responsibility?, 3 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 120, 132–38 (2015).
5. See, e.g., Dov Fox & Alex Stein, Dualism and Doctrine, 90 IND. L.J. 975, 985–92
(2015).
6. See Erika C. Hayden, Taboo Genetics, NATURE, Oct. 3, 2013, at 26; Joanna
Kempner et al., Forbidden Knowledge, 307 SCI. 854 (2005); Paul R. Wolpe, Reasons
Scientists Avoid Thinking about Ethics, 125 CELL 1023 (2006); see generally PHILIP
KITCHER, SCIENCE, TRUTH, AND DEMOCRACY (2001); RICHARD C. LEWONTIN, BIOLOGY AS
IDEOLOGY (1992); RICHARD SHATTUCK, FORBIDDEN KNOWLEDGE (1996); DAVID
BALTIMORE ET AL., LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY (Gerald Holton & Robert Morrison eds.,
1979); Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik & Daniel Schulthess eds., Forbidden Knowledge, 79
MONIST (1996); Gary E. Marchant & Stephanie J. Bird, Editors’ Overview: Forbidding
Science?, 15 SCI. & ENG’G ETHICS 263 (2009).
7. Even in the Garden of Eden what God forbid was not the existence or discovery of
the tree’s fruit, but eating it. Cf. JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST 3, 98, 137, 282 (1821).
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qualify as forbidden. The phenomenon needs a new name. I call it
subversive science.8
What makes certain lines of scientific inquiry “subversive,” in the
sense I mean, is not that it deprives subjects of informed consent to
participate in an experiment, or that it exposes them to unjustified
suffering.9 Nor is it that research visits unknown dangers on future
generations, as germline editing of human embryos might.10 The
subversive element of science that I have in mind is not even the risk that
dual-use studies of airborne viruses or nuclear power can be put to either
peaceful or destructive ends—to sustain goods like public health or
national security, or imperil them.11
Science subverts by disrupting cherished ideologies. One example is
the widely held conviction that individuals choose among different
possible courses of action unimpeded by force or fate. This sense of free
will goes to the heart of subjective identity. Another example is an
animating feature of our social fabric, such as principles of moral equality
that withstand any number of individual or (average) group differences.
Where research might challenge such ideals, many people would give it
free rein, either because the intrinsic value of truth is too great to trade off
or because their compensating benefits inexorably outweigh whatever
havoc the results of that research may wreak.12
Others would stifle such scientific study.13 Scholars across multiple
disciplines and political stripes have pressed agencies that consider human
8. The expression has little resonance today. It was coined a half-century ago by
ecologist Paul B. Sears, Ecology: A Subversive Subject, 14 BIOSCIENCE 11, 11 (1964), who
argued that conservation research, “if taken seriously as an instrument for the long-run
welfare of man-kind, would . . . endanger the assumptions and practices accepted by
modern societies.”
9. Such debasing or harmful methods have discredited notorious research throughout
U.S. history. The Tuskegee study denied poor black men treatment for syphilis after
penicillin was known to cure the disease. SUSAN M. REVERBY, EXAMINING TUSKEGEE: THE
INFAMOUS SYPHILIS STUDY AND ITS LEGACY 32–50 (2009). Milgram had participants
believe they electrocuted innocent strangers. GINA PERRY, BEHIND THE SHOCK MACHINE
65–94 (2012). And the Stanford experiment let subjects acting as “guards” subject
prisoners to psychological torture. PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT 26–47
(2007).
10. See Gina Kolata & Pam Belluck, Why Are Scientists So Upset About the First
Crispr Babies?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2E44tNN; see also Julia D.
Mahoney & Gil Siegal, Beyond Nature? Genomic Modification and the Future of
Humanity, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 204–06 (2018).
11. See Filippa Lentzos & Pamela Silver, Synthesis of Viral Genomes, in
INNOVATION, DUAL USE, AND SECURITY 133–38 (Jonathan B. Tucker ed., 2012).
12. This permissive approach is typified by essays published in leading scientific
journals like Cell, Nature, and Science. See Hayden, supra note 6, at 26; Kempner et al.,
supra note 6, 854; Wolpe, supra note 6, at 1023.
13. See generally KITCHER, supra note 6; LEWONTIN, supra note 6; SHATTUCK, supra
note 6; BALTIMORE ET AL., supra note 6; Lekka-Kowalik & Schulthess, supra note 6);
Marchant & Bird, supra note 6).
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subject inquiries to “reject proposed research that will promote racial
theories of intelligence” for “fostering racism even if not motivated by”
it.14 And they have implored scientists to “exercise restraint” in reporting
on brain studies that risk “disabusing people of the [free will] illusions that
undergird all they hold dear.”15 Calls to restrict this science ring loud and
clear: “If the choice is between the true and the good, then for the sake of
society, the true must go.”16
Both perspectives have a point. The laissez-faire position appreciates
the critical role of science in a free society, and heeds historical lessons
from Galileo’s inquisition to the Scopes trial.17 This view neglects cause
for concern about subversive science in a “post-truth”18 world, in which
social media algorithms increasingly supply “alternative facts” to fortify
whatever people already believe.19 The alternative, reactionary stance is
alert to these dangers. But it undervalues the emancipatory power of
scientific discoveries—from Earth orbiting the sun to Homo sapiens
evolving from apes—to cast out unsound ideals or breathe life into tired
ones.20
This Article charts a third path. I would deflect the threat of
subversive science from abstract conceptions of equality, responsibility,
or dualism. The larger danger concerns the practical ways in which
scientific research can lead people to misperceive those ideals. This middle
ground advises policies that target the transmission of knowledge, not its
production. It would resist calls to defund or restrict subversive science in
favor of mediating its transmission to the public in ways that are designed
to avoid misunderstanding.21

14. John Horgan, Should Research on Race and IQ Be Banned?, SCI. AM.: CROSSCHECK (May 16, 2013), https://bit.ly/2QesJRl.
15. Stephen Cave, There’s No Such Thing as Free Will, ATLANTIC (June 2016),
https://bit.ly/2gY2HEe.
16. Id. Or take the Trump administration’s treatment of global warming, which
embarrasses its creed of America First. See Dov Fox, Can Trump Censor Climate Science?,
HUFF POST (Aug. 31, 2017, 11:55 P.M.), https://bit.ly/2VCTMae. The White House quickly
shut down the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) climate webpage and forbid
agency scientists from discussing their research with media or the public. See Editorial
Board, Editorial, President Trump’s War on Science, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2017),
https://nyti.ms/2wRc0K5.
17. JULES SPELLER, GALILEO’S INQUISITION TRIAL REVISITED 145–60 (2008);
MICHAEL BURGAN, THE SCOPES TRIAL: FAITH, SCIENCE, AND AMERICAN EDUCATION 52–63
(2010).
18. Amy Wang, Post-Truth Named 2016 Word of the Year by Oxford Dictionaries,
WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2016), https://wapo.st/2w6XMFx.
19. See Olivia Ward, Truth, Lies and Democracy: Journalism in the Age of Trump,
BILLMOYERS.COM (Mar. 13, 2017), https://bit.ly/2mCSxIb.
20. See DAVID B. RESNIK, PLAYING POLITICS WITH SCIENCE 115–32 (2009).
21. See infra Part II.C.
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I focus on two central cases of subversive science: genetics research
that lawmakers invoke to oppose social welfare programs, and
neuroscience that criminal lawyers present to exculpate defendants.
Recent and prominent examples abound in each. As for genetics, many
bristle at policies relying on group-difference claims to advocate
eliminating equality-promoting programs such as Head Start.22 When it
comes to the neuroscience, the United States Supreme Court forbids the
harshest punishments for juvenile offenders by appeal to brain imaging
that infers “impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions” result
from children’s “underdeveloped sense of responsibility.”23 Legal scholars
variously fret and celebrate the prospect that new research could reduce
the ascription of culpability even to adults of sound mind who commit
crimes.24
Legal scholars have responded by appeal to theory. No scientific
fact, they say, could weaken rationales for treating citizens as responsible
equals.25 Understandings of equality indeed look immune to empirical
challenge, while concepts of responsibility withstand such encounters for
now, even if brain research might yet one day disprove free will as a
justification for punishment. Science can wear down not only abstract
ideals, but also the ways in which they are adopted in practice. Existing
literature neglects this far more pressing question about the impact that
this science can have on the decisions people make about law and policy.
Society should resist calls to suppress or obscure subversive science,
while attending to its real, distinct, and substantial misinformation
challenges. This Article sets forth clear roles for the scientists who produce
knowledge, the reporters who impart it to the public, and the citizens—
voters, jurors, activists—who fold these facts into their public decisions.
These stakeholders must hold subversive science to domain-specific
standards of proof before incorporating its implications into their stock of
working assumptions about the world.
Part I of this Article defines the democratic ideals of responsibility
and equality and distinguishes theoretical conceptions of those ideals from
people’s practical perceptions of them. Part II examines research
22. See Toby Helm, Michael Gove Urged to Reject ‘Chilling Views’ of His Special
Adviser, GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2013, 3:57 P.M.), https://bit.ly/2WTdT5r (discussing a
memo urging the education secretary to execute reforms reflecting evidence that “up to
70% of a child’s performance is related to his or her genes”).
23. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
24. See, e.g., Matthew Drecun, Cruel and Unusual Parole, 95 TEX. L. REV. 707, 715–
16 (2017); Michael M. O’Hear, Not Just Kid Stuff? Extending Graham and Miller to
Adults, 78 MO. L. REV. 1087, 1094 (2013).
25. See JOHN E. COONS & PATRICK M. BRENNAN, BY NATURE EQUAL 53–54 (1999);
Stephen J. Morse, Neuroscience, Free Will, and Criminal Responsibility, in FREE WILL
AND THE BRAIN 251, 254 (Walter Glannon ed., 2015).
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developments in genetics and neuroscience that threaten to subvert these
ideals and spells out why and how certain among these discoveries lay
widely shared perceptions of those ideals on the line, without imperiling
our best conceptions of them. Part III advances an original framework of
cross-cutting policies to combat cognitive bias. It ranges from scientific
engagement and knowledge brokers to rules about the admission of and
warnings about expert testimony in courts and Congress.
II.

DEMOCRATIC IDEALS

Scientific advances have long been assumed to challenge two ideals
that anchor our legal system. The first of these is the responsibility of
adults with normal capacities to control the conduct in which they engage.
The notion that we are responsible for our actions, and should be treated
as such, animates a broad swath of law and policy that expects us to
comport our behaviors to certain rules, and blames or punishes us for not
doing so.26 The second ideal is equality—here, I focus on moral and legal
equality among salient groups based upon, for example: sex and race. That
individual members of these groups are, and should be, treated as equal
animates important rules and norms against discrimination and
exclusion.27
Responsibility and equality operate at theoretical and practical levels
that are crucial to distinguish. How legal theorists or moral philosophers
conceive of their contours in theory is one thing—this constitutes the
conception of each ideal. But even scholarly consensus may fail to
persuade lay people, who may perceive the meaning of responsibility and
equality in ways that depart from model theory. Common understandings
of these ideals—perceptions of what they mean—are what matter when
members of the public rely on those beliefs on juries and in elections. This
distinction between conceptions and perceptions is central to my
argument: Subversive science can shape how decision-makers perceive
responsibility and equality, even as it leaves the way theorists conceive of
those ideals unscathed. These distinctive influences on perceptions and
conceptions warrants leaving these controversial lines of inquiry to
proceed unobstructed, while imparting their results to the public with
greater care.

26. See THOMAS GREEN, FREEDOM AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN AMERICAN
LEGAL THOUGHT 10 (2014); RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 167–79
(1990).
27. See Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81
MICH. L. REV. 575, 575 (1983); Cass R. Sunstein, General Propositions and Concrete
Cases (with Special Reference to Affirmative Action and Free Speech), 31 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 369, 373 (1996).
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Responsibility

Responsibility, in the moral and legal sense I have in mind, requires
more than just acting in a way that risks some harm or causes some
danger.28 It goes beyond a sufficiently close causal connection between an
action—bumping a bag-toting train passenger, for example—and the
resulting injury when the fireworks within that bag explode.29 Much of our
law reflects the common intuition that individual freedom to choose some
course of action matters morally, apart from its consequences, in
attributing blame. The rules setting forth fines and jail time insist that
punished acts be done voluntarily and culpably—this ideal of individual
responsibility figures prominently in criminal law. Its significance comes
from more than how the law conceives of that ideal in theory. It also
matters how decision-makers perceive it in practice.
1.

Conceptions

To hold a person criminally responsible for some action he performs,
the law demands (for all but strict liability crimes) that he do more than
just act in a way that causes a prohibited outcome. He must consciously
will the action with a culpable state of mind, such as an intent to harm,
knowledge of its likelihood to endanger others, or unjustified indifference
to such risks.30 These requirements for conviction explain why causing
even mass destruction will not make a defendant responsible if he is too
young (no guilty mind), sleepwalks (no voluntary act), or otherwise lacks
the power, capacity, or opportunity to do what is legally required.31
What justifies restricting the reach of criminal law to voluntary acts
that are performed with a guilty mind? It is the assumption that human
beings have rational faculties that enable them to meaningfully choose
whether to act in way A and not B or C. It would be unfair to hold people
responsible, on this view, if delusion or duress keeps them from being able
to reasonably decide to act in some other way. The conception of
responsibility at the heart of our criminal law requires the kinds of

28. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW,
MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS 21 (2009) (explaining that causing harm is “neither sufficient
nor necessary for moral responsibility” under the “moral view reflected in the structure of
Anglo-American criminal law,” but instead “increases the blameworthiness of an already
blameworthy defendant” when he tried to bring such harm about, or at least risked it).
29. See Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
30. See United States v. Lyons 739 F.2d 994, 998 (5th Cir. 1984) (“An adjudication
of guilt is more than a factual determination that the defendant pulled a trigger, took a
bicycle, or sold heroin. It is a moral judgment that the individual is blameworthy.”).
31. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW, CH. IV (2008).
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conscious intentions or beliefs on which basic acts may be praised or
punished.32
2.

Perceptions

Beyond abstractions, ordinary understandings about responsibility—
what it is, who has it, and under what conditions—also matter a great deal
for the law.33 The way in which citizens think about responsibility informs
more than just votes for elected officials who promise either law and order
or criminal justice reform. Decisions about capital punishment depend on
whether jurors think an “individual has lost his moral entitlement to live.”34
After finding a defendant guilty of a death-eligible crime, jurors are
afforded broad discretion to bring their beliefs about responsibility to bear
on whether the defendant should live or die.35 Our law leaves the
determination of mitigating factors and their balancing against aggravating
ones to jurors’ open-ended judgments about which aspects of a
defendant’s background, character, and crime they think make him more
or less responsible.36
Legislators also draw on perceptions of responsibility to determine
which crimes get what punishments. The Eighth Amendment proportional
requirements “forbid[] only extreme sentences that are grossly
disproportionate to the crime.”37 That courts consider enacted laws to be
the “clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary
values”38 explains a judicial “tradition of deferring to state legislatures in
making and implementing such important policy decisions.”39 This
deference invests lawmakers with broad discretion to determine
sentencing guidelines for certain classes of offenses or offenders based on
32. See Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1592–
94 (1994). This is not to assume that criminal responsibility is necessarily compatible with
decision making in a world that is deterministic. See Adam J. Kolber, Free Will as a Matter
of Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 9, 17–18 (Michael
Pardo & Dennis Patterson eds., 2016).
33. See Emad H. Atiq, How Folk Beliefs About Free Will Influence Sentencing: A
New Target for the Neuro-Determinist Critics of Criminal Law, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 449,
467 (2013).
34. Spaziano v. Florida, 465 U.S. 447, 468–89 (1984) (Stevens J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
35. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (invalidating limits on a jury’s
consideration of mitigating factors).
36. See Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275 (1998) (holding that the
Constitution imposes no obligation on judges or legislatures to instruct capital jury on
mitigating factors).
37. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). The
Court has subsequently treated Justice Kennedy’s Harmelin opinion as controlling. See
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23–24 (2003) (plurality opinion).
38. Roper, 543 U.S. at 331.
39. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24–25 (2003).
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their own beliefs (or those of their constituents) about what legal
responsibility entails.40
B.

Equality

Conceptions and perceptions of equality loom large among policies
that entitle citizens to the same sort of rights or resources. The ideal
implies shared qualities or relations among people that justify treating
them equally.41 Equality claims carry moral force “because they are
regarded as affirming an equality which is believed in some sense already
to exist.”42 That is how Bernard Williams puts it. “[T]he normative
conclusion that people ought to be treated equally,” Peter Westen infers,
“rests on the factual premise that they are equal.”43
The Declaration of Independence evokes this line between normative
and descriptive equality in declaring people (at first, white men) “endowed
with certain unalienable rights.”44 What motivates this normative equality
is a descriptive equality which assumes that “all men are created equal.”45
The Declaration upholds this basic sense of sameness among men (later
extended to all people) as a moral condition for the law to ratify and
implement. But it does not specify the sense in which people are equal in
their intrinsic value or inherent worth. It famously proclaims that
proposition and its meaning “self-evident.”46 My concern is the content of
this descriptive claim, so frequently invoked to justify egalitarian laws and
policies.
1.

Conceptions

The conception of equality that moors antidiscrimination and similar
laws most plausibly looks to the powers that people share to reason about
what is good and right.47 These equal capacities for what Rawls called
“moral personality” lay the secure groundwork that resists disruption
through data or demonstration.48 So human equality is not, on this view,
40. The sentencing guidelines, while now advisory rather than mandatory, strongly
encourage courts to abide by legislatively specified ranges. See United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 224, 264 (2005).
41. See JOHN WILSON, EQUALITY 98 (1966).
42. Bernard Williams, The Idea of Equality, in BERNARD WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF
THE SELF 111–12 (1973).
43. PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY 266 (1990).
44. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Benjamin Eidelson, Treating People as Individuals, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 203, 213 (Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau eds.,
2013).
48. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 442 (Harv. U. Press 2000) (1921); COONS &
BRENNAN, supra note 25, at 41–43.
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“the empirical claim that all groups of humans are interchangeable; it is
the moral principle that individuals should not be judged or constrained by
the average [or assumed] properties of their group.”49
Affirmations of genetic similarity emerged as a way to dislodge the
pernicious view that some people “are naturally inferior or . . . only fitted
for a narrow range of opportunities and positions.”50 Nobel laureate
Gunnar Myrdal explained that “the moral equality doctrine carried with it,
even in America, a tendency toward a belief in biological egalitarianism”
that denies meaningful genetic variation as a way to deprive group
discrimination of its putative logic or justification.51 But it is a mistake to
ground the moral equality of humans on their natural similarity—
difference becomes an argument for inequality.52
2.

Perceptions

Real-world beliefs about equality matter too.53 One such context is
voter support for funding of opportunities that privilege some at the
expense of others. For example, the Head Start program provides small
classes and better teachers to foster academic success;54 but the taxpayerfunded program is costly and limited to low-income minorities.55 Citizens
might deny funding to equalize opportunities through such policies if they
deem the children who would benefit less worthy by their very nature. The
Bell Curve provoked a national firestorm with its claims of a genetic basis
for IQ differences between African-Americans and Caucasians.56 Authors
Charles Murray and Richard Herrnstein argued that socioeconomic
disparities owe less to environmental factors like poverty, racism, and bad
schools than to inferior aptitude by poorer performing minority students.57
Genomics research today seeks to rehabilitate a personalized version
of this connection between biology and school that distances itself from

49. STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE
340 (2003).
50. See, e.g., Philip Kitcher, An Argument About Free Inquiry, 31 NOUS 279, 281
(1997).
51. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 84 (1944).
52. See A.W. Edwards, Human Genetic Diversity: Lewontin’s Fallacy 25 BIOESSAYS
798, 801 (2003); see also James F. Crow, Unequal By Nature: A Geneticist’s Perspective
on Human Differences, DÆDALUS 81, 84–85 (2002).
53. See, e.g., Celeste M. Condit et al., Human Equality, Affirmative Action, and
Genetic Models of Human Variation, 4 RHETORIC & PUB. AFF. 85, 100 (2001).
54. See EDWARD ZIGLER & SUSAN MUENCHOW, HEAD START: THE INSIDE STORY OF
AMERICA’S MOST SUCCESSFUL EDUCATIONAL EXPERIMENT 755 (1992).
55. See id. at 17, 138.
56. See RICHARD HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE 389416
(1994).
57. See id. at 38993.
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claims of entrenched inequality.58 “Genetic differences in human life are a
scientific fact,” one researcher argues, and “knowing which genes are
associated with educational success will help scientists understand how
different environments also affect that success . . . . [I]f we want to invest
wisely in interventions that can truly make a difference.”59 But when it
comes to genetics research, it is notoriously difficult to wall off discussion
about individual differences without implying group differences. Today’s
studies of intelligence that never mention race are still invoked to argue
that genes should decide which types of children get special access to
scarce advantages.60
III. DISRUPTIVE DISCOVERIES
The kind of research I am concerned with aims to build on
generalizable facts about the world by using experimental means to
generate or analyze them. Scientific inquiry systematically develops,
refines, extends, or rejects established propositions in the pursuit of truth.61
It accumulates empirical observations and trials to extend reliable
explanations, predictions, and applications to more and more natural
phenomena.62 Science seeks “to increase the store of human knowledge.”63
That project becomes subversive when it challenges a dominant social
ideology: here, the ideals of responsibility and equality so central to our
democratic system. What matters is not just the abstract conception of
those ideals, but practical perceptions of them. These real-world beliefs
are what lay vulnerable to certain research in neuroscience and genetics.
A.

Neuroscience and Free Will

Two lines of neuroscientific inquiry have captured public
imagination as a threat to popular understandings of responsibility. The
first—imaging research—generates real-time pictures of the neural
processes that explain human decisions.64 However free these decisions
seem to us, some worry their visual representation threatens to expose
58. See KATHRYN ASBURY & ROBERT PLOMIN, G IS FOR GENES 1421, 14146 (2014).
59. Kathryn P. Harden, Why Progressives Should Embrace the Genetics of
Education, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2K4odAa.
60. See, e.g., Carl Zimmer, In ‘Enormous Success,’ Scientists Tie 52 Genes to Human
Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2rLkFu3; Aaron Panofsky, What
Does Behavioral Genetics Offer for Improving Education?, 45 HASTINGS CNTR. REP. S43,
S49 (2015).
61. See Carl G. Hempel, Inductive Inconsistencies, 12 SYNTHESE 439, 460 (1960).
62. See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 234 (2d ed.,
1970).
63. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 976 (4th Cir. 1990).
64. See DAWN M. MCBRIDE & J. COOPER CUTTING, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY:
THEORY, PROCESS, AND METHODOLOGY 36–37 (2d ed. 2018).

ART 4 - SUBVERSIVE SCIENCE (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

SUBVERSIVE SCIENCE

10/12/2019 11:59 AM

165

brain activity as the accumulation of genetic, environmental, and other
causes, none of which we choose or control. The second—timing
research—looks instead at whether the unconscious brain processes that
precede and seem to initiate certain actions leave any room for conscious
decisions.65 This section analyzes the challenge of causal determinism and
preconscious bypassing, and argues that neither threatens the conception
of responsibility in criminal law—which is not to say that they might not
imperil the perceptions of that ideal.
1.

Brain Imaging

Scanning technologies are no longer limited to static pictures of the
brain to locate head injuries or neurological disease. Imaging tools can
measure variations in blood flows and electrical waves to generate vivid
detail of what is happening inside the brain at a particular point in time.66
These operations are so complex it might never be possible to reliably or
precisely predict the presence of deception, bias, or pain, let alone their
influence on decisions.67 And yet, functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) studies have begun to yield evidence that can be used to identify
which trial witnesses are lying,68 whether employment discrimination
defendants are biased,69 and how much personal injury plaintiffs are
suffering.70
Cognitive scientists Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen have argued
this research, by putting our brain activity on display in real-time and highresolution, shows that all mental states can be fully explained by the
workings of the brain.71 “Every decision is a thoroughly mechanical
65. See id. at 33–34.
66. See id. at 34–36.
67. See Emily R. Murphy & Henry T. Greely, What Will Be the Limits of
Neuroscience-Based Mindreading in the Law?, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF NEUROETHICS
635, 642 (Judy Illes ed., 2011).
68. See Shawn E. Christ et al., The Contributions of Prefrontal Cortex and Executive
Control to Deception: Evidence from Activation Likelihood Estimate Meta-analyses, 19
CEREBRAL CORTEX 1557, 1559 (2009). For further discussion, see Dov Fox, The Right to
Silence Protects Mental Control, in 13 LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 335, 342–48 (Michael
Freeman ed., 2011).
69. See Harrison A. Korn et al., Neurolaw: Differential Brain Activity for Black and
White Faces Predicts Damage Awards in Hypothetical Employment Discrimination Cases,
7 SOC. NEUROSCIENCE 398, 404 (2012). For additional discussion, see Dov Fox, NeuroVoir Dire and the Architecture of Bias, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 999, 1015 (2014).
70. See Justin E. Brown et al., Toward a Physiology-Based Measure of Pain: Patterns
of Human Brain Activity Distinguish Painful from Non-Painful Thermal Stimulation, PLOS
ONE, Sept. 13, 2011, at 2, 7. For further discussion, see Amanda C. Pustilnik, Pain as Fact
and Heuristic: How Pain Neuroimaging Illuminates Moral Dimensions of Law, 97
CORNELL L. REV. 801, 811–16 (2012).
71. Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing
and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS. ROYAL SOC’Y. B.: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775, 1778
(2004).
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process,” they say, “the outcome of which is completely determined by the
results of prior mechanical processes.”72
The brain is a physical thing subject to the rules of the physical world.
The physical world is determined; therefore, the brain must also be
determined. If the brain is determined and the brain enables the mind,
thoughts and actions arising from the mind must also be determined
occurrences rather than voluntary expressions of free will.73

Imaging looks to reveal a causal bottleneck in the brain through
which the sum of genetic, environmental, and other forces affect a person’s
beliefs and behaviors.74 “Ordinary conceptions of human action and
responsibility” are flawed, on this account, and “the legal principles we
have devised to reflect these conceptions” accordingly require radical
revision to reflect less robust accounts of free will.75
The following real-world case illustrates the ostensible threat that
brain imaging poses to responsibility. A 40-year-old man developed a
sudden interest in child pornography and was thereafter convicted of child
molestation for fondling his 12-year-old stepdaughter.76 Court records kept
his name anonymous, so let us call him Russell. As a first-time offender,
Russell could avoid incarceration by passing a simple treatment program.
But he flunked, complaining of acute headaches. A brain scan revealed a
tumor the size of an egg.77 After surgery removed the tumor, Russell’s
urges toward children vanished. He then completed the treatment program
easily and returned to his law-abiding self. However, when his urges
returned months later imaging revealed that the tumor had as well. When
it was once more removed, those impulses again went along with it.78
Brain tumors like this are so rare that it might seem like a mistake to
make too much of the example. But Uri Maoz and Gideon Yaffe explain
how its implications reach beyond such vivid and fixable impairments on
the individual’s capacity to act freely.79 Russell’s criminal behavior “is no
different from anyone else’s,” they argue, in that it “has its source in the

72. Id.; see also SAUL SMILANSKY, FREE WILL AND ILLUSION 137–38 (2000).
73. See generally Nita Farahany, A Neurological Foundation for Freedom, 2012
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4 (2012).
74. See generally NADA GLIGOROV, NEUROETHICS AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVISION OF
COMMON SENSE 46 (2016).
75. Greene & Cohen, supra note 71, at 1779–80.
76. See Jeffrey M. Burns & Russell H. Swerdlow, Right Orbitofrontal Tumor with
Pedophilia Symptom and Constructional Apraxia Sign, 60 JAMA NEUROLOGY 437, 437
(2003).
77. Id. at 438.
78. Id.
79. See Uri Maoz & Gideon Yaffe, What Does Recent Neuroscience Tell Us About
Criminal Responsibility?, 3 J.L. & BIOSCIENCE 120, 120–22 (2016).
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person’s brain and his environment.”80 And “if we knew enough about the
brain and our medical technology was sophisticated enough, wouldn’t
every case in every courtroom be just like” this one?81 Perhaps not. Our
criminal law operates to punish any adults who commit crimes, even if
under the effect of mental illness, so long as they exhibit minimal capacity
to reason or tell right from wrong. Russell’s case raises the question of
whether culpability should turn on this threshold level of rational or moral
capacity, or whether a person’s action can be traced less to his “will” than
to the unchosen forces in his brain—genetics, randomness, or tumors—
that are themselves caused by a cascade of similarly unchosen forces that
came before.
It is difficult to imagine what visual representations of the activity in
a person’s brain could prove him non-responsible for some act that he
committed.82 People with the same brain scans might behave very
differently. Unless someone lacks the minimal required capacity to reason,
or has some other excuse, the criminal law still holds the person
responsible even in a deterministic world.83 There is, however, a greater
neuroscientific threat to responsibility. This comes from research about
the timing of decision-making activity in the brain, which seems to suggest
that unconscious brain events bypass our conscious intentions altogether.
2.

Brain Timing

We think that we act when and how we intend to, even if those
decisions are hasty. But timing experiments purport to show that intentions
to act form only after those actions have been set into motion by
unconscious activity in the brain. Intentions are less drivers of action, by
this account, than side effects of neural mechanisms. Benjamin Libet
pioneered this timing research in the 1980s.84 Libet measured brain activity
in subjects using an electroencephalogram (EEG) device that looks like a
hat with tentacles.85 With the EEG affixed to their scalp, subjects were
asked to flex a finger at the exact moment they felt the urge to perform
that simple movement.86 They reported that time using a modified clock
80. Id. at 122.
81. Id. at 121. For a critical discussion of this analysis, see generally Dennis
Patterson, Criminal Law, Neuroscience and Voluntary Acts, 3 J.L. & BIOSCIENCE 355
(2016).
82. See Stephen J. Morse, Lost in Translation?, in 13 L. & NEUROSCIENCE: CURRENT
LEGAL ISSUES 529, 533 (Michael Freeman ed., 2010).
83. See Adam Kolber, Will There Be a Neurolaw Revolution?, 89 IND. L.J. 807,
82026 (2014).
84. See BENJAMIN LIBET, MIND TIME: THE TEMPORAL FACTOR IN CONSCIOUSNESS 7578 (2004).
85. See id.
86. See id.
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whose second hand swept 25 times faster than an ordinary one, marking
off 40-millisecond intervals around the periphery.87 Participants reported
when they intended to flex, while EEGs measured the onset of motor
preparation.88
These measures revealed a pattern. The recorded brain activity
increased slowly leading up to the finger flexing, and then fell sharply after
that movement. Libet called this horseshoe-shaped pattern of brain activity
“readiness potential.”89 It showed up anytime subjects were asked to watch
the clock and time their intent to move a finger—but not when they did
not act on that intention—suggesting it represents the brain activity that
sets human action into motion. Libet found the onset of this readiness
potential consistently preceded, by a fraction of a second, the moment at
which subjects said they had become aware of their intention to flex.90
Timing Results of Libet Experiment
−550 milliseconds

−200 milliseconds

0 milliseconds

Readiness Potential

Reported Awareness

Muscle Movement

That the readiness potential began before the subjects’ reported
awareness of their intention implies that this potential could not have been
caused by their later-occurring intentions. The implication is arresting: I
myself am not aware of whatever it is that activates the brain processes
that make my body move. That initial trigger lies beyond my mindful
control.91
Some neuroscientists argue that this shows that the unconscious brain
activity that precedes conscious intention encodes how a person will

87. Id. at 8386.
88. Id. at 9192, 96101.
89. Id. at 133–36.
90. Id. at 15157.
91. See Benjamin Libet, Do We Have Free Will?, 6 J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 47, 51–
52 (1999). Libet’s finding that readiness potential precedes conscious intention has been
replicated by scientists using more reliable ways to measure brain activity than those
available to Libet. See, e.g., Chun S. Soon et al., Unconscious Determinants of Free
Decisions in the Human Brain, 11 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 543, 54344 (2008). These new
studies, like Libet’s, have found that the recorded brain activity preceded subjects’
awareness that they intended to press the button—this time, up to nine seconds before they
realized that intention. See Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Lessons from Libet, in CONSCIOUS
WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY: A TRIBUTE TO BENJAMIN LIBET 235, 237–38 (Walter SinnottArmstrong & Lynn Nadel eds., 2011). For further discussion, see Victoria Saigle et al., The
Impact of a Landmark Neuroscience Study on Free Will: A Qualitative Analysis of Articles
Using Libet and Colleagues’ Methods, 9 AJOB NEUROSCIENCE 29, 41 (2018).
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decide.92 Our minds backdate the subjective experience of conscious
control, they argue, to a previous time at which readiness potential could
be measured in the cortex.93 By inferring intentionality after the fact, we
reorder our perception of events to preserve the sense that we intend our
actions.94 Suppose these findings cannot be explained, as scholars have
argued, by methodological flaws like inaccurate reporting times.95 That
our unconscious brain activity predicts what we do before we decide to do
it seems to relegate the conscious self to a spectator’s role in driving
action. What we experience as intention is really part of an unconscious
sequence set in motion long before.96 Our intentions are not causally
determined by unchosen forces—instead, they are less conscious than
unconscious.97
To be sure, finger flexes are not the kind of reason-based action to
which we usually assign responsibility. Detached from justifying or
motivating grounds to choose among options, moreover, that decision is
arbitrary. That it is initiated by unconscious brain processes may not,
therefore, tell us anything about actions we have reason to care about for
matters of responsibility.98 And besides, the very fact that unconscious
brain processes precede a person’s urge to act does not crowd out a causal
role for conscious agency or voluntary control. These findings still leave
space—in the time before the readiness potential is activated—for the
individual to choose either to permit or to prevent any of those urges.
Neuro-timing studies have consistently found a window of time
between the push-button of awareness of intent and the action itself that is
more than sufficient for a person to decide whether to consummate an actin-progress. Libet himself wrote that the conscious mind stands guard like
a gatekeeper, letting some of the “unconscious initiatives” that “‘bubbl[e]
92. See Jeffrey P. Ebert & Daniel M. Wegner, Bending Time to One’s Will, in
CONSCIOUS WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY: A TRIBUTE TO BENJAMIN LIBET 134, 137 (Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong & Lynn Nadel eds., 2011).
93. See TOR NORRETRANDERS, FEEL THE WORLD: THE SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS
319 (1997).
94. Say you are driving down a street when a boy runs in front of the car. Your
awareness of the boy takes longer than (occurs after) braking to avoid him. See LIBET,
supra note 84, at 183.
95. See Alexander Batthyany, Mental Causation and Free Will after Libet and Soon:
Reclaiming Conscious Agency, in IRREDUCIBLY CONSCIOUS 135, 137 (Alexander
Batthyany & Avshalom C. Elitzur eds., 2009); Daniel C. Dennett, The Self as a
Responding—and Responsible—Artifact, 1001 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 39, 4243 (2006).
96. John-Dylan Haynes, Beyond Libet: Long-term Prediction of Free Choices from
Neuroimaging Signals, in CONSCIOUS WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY: A TRIBUTE TO BENJAMIN
LIBET 85, 92 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Lynn Nadel eds., 2011).
97. See Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts,
87 MINN. L. REV. 269, 328 (2002).
98. See Dennis Patterson, Legal Dimensions of Neural Antecedents to Voluntary
Action, COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1, 8 (2014).
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up’ in the brain” take completed form as actions, while holding others
back.99 This gatekeeper view preserves a kind of veto power. This view
demotes the role of the conscious will from the volition of free will to the
regulation of free won’t. But it does not imply that our brain decides before
we do.100 Timing research just shows, unremarkably, that “urges come
before intentions.”101
B.

Genetics and Human Diversity

Few lines of scientific research are more explosive today than inquiry
into biological variation among groups. Human biodiversity is wholly
uncontroversial as to certain individual differences in, for example, height.
But invoking it is divisive as even a partial explanation for sex- or racebased differences in other socially valued traits, such as athleticism or
intelligence. Jonathan Haidt has rightly called genetic research into these
kinds of group differences “the most offensive idea in all of science for the
last 40 years.”102
A wall has long protected respectable inquiry from accusations of aiding
and abetting racism. That wall is the belief that genetic change happens
at such a glacial pace that there simply was not time, in the 50,000 years
since humans spread out from Africa, for selection pressures to have
altered the genome in anything but the most trivial way (e.g., changes in
skin color and nose shape were adaptive responses to cold climates).103

Evolutionary pressure on populations in diverse geographical
environments contributes to certain differences among groups that
descended from them.104 Continental separation and reproductive
isolation, together with genetic drift, natural selection, and countless
environmental exposures, have generated complex patterns of biological
diversity among ancestral groups.105

99. LIBET, supra note 84, at 1, 7.
100. See Nadelhoffer & Nahmias, infra note 145 at 173, 18182. Compatibilists may
not even demand that timing research admit of this veto power for the state of this
neuroscience to preserve the free will required for criminal responsibility. See Atiq, supra
note 33, at 467; see also Kolber, supra note 83, at 82026 and accompanying text.
101. See Timothy J. Bayne & Neil Levy, The Feeling of Doing: Deconstructing the
Phenomenology of Agency, in DISORDERS OF VOLITION 49, 6364 (Natalie Sebanz &
Wolfgang Prinz eds., 2006).
102. Jonathan Haidt, Faster Evolution Means More Ethnic Differences,
THEEDGE.ORG, https://bit.ly/30Thvqy (last visited July 18, 2019).
103. Id.
104. See L. LUCA CAVALLI-SFORZA ET AL., THE HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY OF HUMAN
GENES 16 (1994); YUVAL NOAH HARARI, SAPIENS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF HUMANKIND 525
(2015).
105. See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE STRUCTURE OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 510–46
(2002).
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Until recently, our understanding of genetic variation was limited by
too-similar population samples, low-density gene markers, and crude tools
to measure them.106 But global collaboration now generates genome-wide
data sets that make it possible to analyze variation across geographically
diverse populations.107 In contrast to the field of genetics, which studies
heredity one gene at a time, genomics enlists the far greater information
enabled by genome-wide tools to study the effects of many genes all at
once.
Modern genetics creates a paradox with regard to human biological
sameness and difference. Genetics confirms the close kinship and
common origins of all humans and definitively establishes that race is a
social, and not a biological, construct. At the same time, genetics
provides a detailed array of information about individual variation at an
exquisitely refined, molecular level. Genetics helps explain, among other
things, why particular individuals differ in response to pharmaceutical
products, have certain allergies, or should avoid certain exposures.
Genetic information may even permit predictions about the future course
of individual health and development.108

Two strands of this research lurk as threats to equality.109 One looks
at physical differences, ancestry tests, medical treatments, or forensic
tools.110 The other concerns cognitive differences like intelligence.111
1.

Physical Differences

Variants underlying even genetically simple physical traits, like skin
color, can vary enormously in how they are expressed.112 But some traits
do manifest group-based differences. Take lactose intolerance. People
who can digest milk products as adults carry gene variants for the lactase

106. See Hannah Pulker et al., Finding Genes that Underlie Physical Traits of
Forensic Interest Using Genetic Tools, 1 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETICS 100, 101 (2007).
107. See Noah A. Rosenberg et al., Genetic Structure of Human Populations, 298
SCI. 2381, 2384 (2002); Noah A. Rosenberg et al., Clines, Clusters, and the Effect of Study
Design on the Inference of Human Population Structure, 1 PLOS GENETICS 660, 667
(2005).
108. Rothstein, supra note 3, at 453 (footnote omitted).
109. See JONATHAN MARKS, HUMAN BIODIVERSITY: GENES, RACE, AND HISTORY
18395 (1995).
110. See generally Jonathan D. Kahn, Beyond BiDil: The Expanding Embrace of
Race in Biomedical Research and Product Development, 3 ST. LOUIS U.J. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 61 (2009); Bert-Jaap Koops & Maurice H.M. Schellekens, Forensic DNA
Phenotyping: Regulatory Issues, 9 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 158 (2008).
111. See Robert Plomin, Molecular Genetics and g, in THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF
GENERAL INTELLIGENCE: TRIBUTE TO ARTHUR JENSEN 107, 108 (Helmuth Nyborg ed.,
2003).
112. See Rebecca L. Lamason et al., SLC24A5, a Putative Caution Exchanger, Affects
Pigmentation in Zebrafish and Humans, 310 SCI. 1782, 1786 (2005).
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enzyme that breaks down dairy proteins. Selection for these variants
appears in people who descended within the past 10,000 years from
eastern Africa or northern Europe. These populations survived on dairybased farming, so drinking animal milk conferred a nutritional
advantage.113 Lactose intolerance, pervasive in much of the world, is rare
among modern Swedes, Danes, and Tutsis who share gene variants for
lactose digestion.114
Scholars express anxiety that genomic inquiries into group-based
physical differences will shore up racial stereotypes or division.115
Genocide, slavery, segregation, and sterilization, they note, have
historically appealed to physical differences like skin color, hair type, and
skeletal structure. These are differences that genetics research has the
power to vindicate and legitimize.116 Some worry that forensic medicine
and anthropology “may be used to revive long discredited 19th century
theories of race” as a fact reducible to biology.117 Others fear that
“increasing acceptance of DNA science that ascribes a genetic dimension
to race has the potential to . . . usher in a new era of scientific racism.”118
The idea that physical variation among groups has a biological basis
indeed captured the public imagination in contexts from medicine to
athleticism.119 But these kinds of skin-deep differences matter less than the
cognitive or behavioral diversity it implicates. Whatever concerns genetic
differences in physical traits might raise, their deeper disquiet relates to
ramifications for natural hierarchies of intellectual capacity.120
2.

Mental Differences

General intelligence—the ability to plan, reason, think abstractly,
solve problems, grasp complex ideas, and learn from experience—
correlates relatively well with academic attainment and income.121 Twin
113. See Dallas M. Swallow, Genetics of Lactase Persistence and Lactose
Intolerance, 37 ANN. REV. GENETICS 197, 198–204 (2003).
114. See Joachim Burger et al., Absence of the Lactase-Persistence-Associated Allele
in Early Neolithic Europeans, 104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 3736, 3737–38 (2007).
115. See Amy Harmon, The DNA Age: In DNA Era, New Worries About Prejudice,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/11/us/11dna.html.
116. See TROY DUSTER, BACKDOOR TO EUGENICS 2 (2d ed. 2003).
117. OSAGIE K. OBASOGIE, PLAYING THE GENE CARD? A REPORT ON RACE AND
HUMAN BIOTECHNOLOGY, viii (2009).
118. Christian B. Sundquist, The Meaning of Race in the DNA Era: Science, History
and the Law, 27 TEMP. J. SCI., TECH. & ENVTL. L. 231, 265 (2008).
119. See generally JON ENTINE, TABOO: WHY BLACK ATHLETES DOMINATE SPORTS
AND WHY WE’RE AFRAID TO TALK ABOUT IT (2000).
120. See Steven Rose et al., Should Scientists Study Race and IQ? 457 NATURE 786,
789 (2009).
121. See Jonathan A. Plucker & Amy L. Shelton, General Intelligence (g): Overview
of a Complex Construct and Its Implications for Genetics Research, 45 HASTINGS CTR.
REP. S21, S23–S24 (2015).
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studies show that variation in IQ has a large, if mysterious, hereditary
component.122 And behavioral geneticists have long sought gene variants
to explain why some individuals have greater mental ability than others.123
According to James Watson, the provocative Nobel laureate who codiscovered the DNA double helix: “There is no firm reason that the
intellectual capacities of people geographically separated in their
evolution should prove to have evolved identically.”124 Recent years have
seen renewed hopes that whole genomic sequencing on large enough
samples to detect small effects across genetic differences will “make
progress in understanding the genetic architecture of intelligence.”125
Geneticists today can access international collaborations of genome
data from thousands of high-IQ people worldwide in search of variations
associated with intelligence.126 The promise of genome-wide association
studies, or GWAS, to predict human traits across diverse populations is
limited by their heavy reliance on research subjects of European
ancestry.127 And the quest to identify intelligence-linked variants has so
far revealed mostly null results and false positives.128 But recent DNA
analysis of over 1,000,000 people used genetic probabilities to explain
roughly 11% of differences in educational attainment—more than the
variation predicted by parental schooling.129 Another research team
identified three variants connected with higher levels of education
attainment in nearly 130,000 people.130 A third team’s analysis of almost

122. See Ziada Ayorech et al., Genetic Influence on Intergenerational Educational
Attainment, 28 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1302, 1307 (2017) (finding that genetics explained half of
the differences in social mobility).
123. See NICHOLAS WADE, A TROUBLESOME INHERITANCE: GENES, RACE AND HUMAN
HISTORY 111–12, 221–22 (2014); see also Patrick D. Evans et al., Microcephalin, A Gene
Regulating Brain Size, Continues to Evolve Adaptively in Humans, 309 SCI. 1717, 1720
(2005).
124. JAMES D. WATSON, AVOID BORING PEOPLE: LESSONS FROM A LIFE IN SCIENCE
326 (2007).
125. Erik Parens & Paul S. Appelbaum, An Introduction to Thinking about
Trustworthy Research into the Genetics of Intelligence, 45 HASTINGS CTR. REP. S2, S2
(2015).
126. See Lee M. Butcher et al., Genome-Wide Quantitative Trait Locus Association
Scan of General Cognitive Ability Using Pooled DNA and 500K Single Nucleotide
Polymorphism Microarrays, 7 GENES, BRAINS & BEHAV. 435, 440–44 (2008).
127. See Alice B. Popejoy & Stephanie M. Fullerton, Genomics is Failing on
Diversity, 538 NATURE 161, 164 (2016).
128. See generally Christopher F. Chabris et al., Most Reported Genetic Associations
with General Intelligence Are Probably False Positives, 23 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1314 (2012).
129. See James J. Lee et al., Gene Discovery and Polygenic Prediction from a
Genome-Wide Association Study of Educational Attainment in 1.1 Million Individuals, 50
NATURE GENETICS 1112, 1115 (2018).
130. See generally Cornelius A. Rietveld et al., GWAS of 126,559 Individuals
Identifies Genetic Variants Associated with Educational Attainment, 340 SCI. 1467 (2013).
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80,000 people turned up 52 genes linked to intelligence.131 All emphasized
how small of an influence the specified genes combined to have on
intelligence.
Environmental, epigenetic, and other forces influence cognitive
ability as well, beside the cumulative effects of thousands more genes
awaiting discovery. The effect of these genetic variants may remain
uncertain and unpredictable in any person, let alone group. That is because
the small effects of myriad variants interact with other parts of the genome
and surrounding world in ways that will simply be too complex to add
up.132 Children adopted from working-class homes to middle-class ones
see an IQ boost of 12–18 points, for example, while the IQ gap between
African Americans and Caucasians has recently dropped by 0.33 standard
deviation.133 These findings show that factors like socioeconomics have a
substantial, if indeterminate, effect.
Charles Murray, co-author of Bell Curve, blames the “taboo against
discussion of group differences” for sustaining a false “assumption of no
innate differences among groups” that “suffuses American social
policy.”134 Behavioral geneticist Robert Plomin affirms: “The unwelcome
truth is that equal opportunity will not produce equality of outcome
because people differ in g [intelligence] in part for genetic reasons,”
despite the crucial role of “non-genetic factors” to “the development of
individual differences in g.”135 Crude accounts of this genetic contribution
have been deployed to naturalize and justify existing racial, ethnic, or sex
disparities that cast certain groups as less worthy or well-suited for
opportunities by virtue of their DNA. Even if g were fixed at birth across
certain groups, that would not diminish the standing of some relative to
others. And yet this idea can be lost on those who find in purported group
differences a ready explanation for a range of social ills.

131. See Suzanne Sniekers et al., Genome-Wide Association Meta-Analysis of 78,308
Individuals Identifies New Loci and Genes Influencing Human Intelligence, 49 NATURE
GENETICS 1107, 1109–10 (2017).
132. See Eric Turkheimer, Genetic Prediction, 45 HASTINGS CTR. REP. S32, S35–S37
(2015).
133. Richard E. Nisbett et al., Intelligence: New Findings and Theoretical
Developments, 67 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 130, 142 (2012). But see Bo Winegard et al., Getting
Voxed: Charles Murray, Ideology, and the Debate on IQ, QUILLETTE.COM (June 2, 2017),
https://bit.ly/2WoZnFu.
134. Charles Murray, The Inequality Taboo, AM. ENTER. INST. (Sept. 1, 2005),
https://bit.ly/2WnmMqR.
135. Robert Plomin, Genetics and General Cognitive Ability, 402 NATURE C25, C29
(1999). See generally ROBERT PLOMIN, BLUEPRINT: HOW DNA MAKES US WHO WE ARE
(2018) (examining the influence of people’s genetics on their observable characteristics).
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How Science Subverts

Equality and responsibility are cornerstones of our liberal democracy.
If these ideals are under siege by advances in neuroscientific and genomic
research, it is not because existing science has established that individuals
of sound mind are not responsible for their actions or less equal than the
members of another group. Indeed, these normative ideals may be
altogether immune to empirical challenge.136 This does not prove,
however, that science is not subversive. After all, legal theorists are not
the ones who put those ideals into practice. Their operation relies instead
on legislators, voters, judges, and jurors—scientific and philosophical
laypeople who cannot apply relevant training and expertise to their
understanding of these ideals or their susceptibility to empirical findings.
These decision-makers are vulnerable to fictions about agency and identity
that steer conclusions about responsibility and equality astray. Biases
about mechanism and essentialism represent the genuine and pressing risk
that subversive science poses to democratic ideals.
1.

Beliefs about Mechanism

The two lines of neuroscientific inquiry examined in this section
invite distinct cognitive biases at odds with human agency. Imaging
research implicates an assumption of causal determinism that many think
compatible with holding people responsible for what they do.
Determinism holds that people’s actions and intentions are themselves
caused by a jumble of forces, none of which they chose or exercised
control over. Timing research, in turn, triggers a sense of preconscious
bypassing that is much harder for people to square with lay perceptions of
responsibility. Bypassing is the idea that what seems like a person’s
intentions, in fact, results from unconscious urges, such that his
consciousness plays no causal role in acting this way and not that.
a.

Determinism

Psychologists measure how much imaging research triggers beliefs
in determinism and the effect on perceptions of responsibility. One study
asked 1,170 Americans to take part in a mock trial that presented them
with either psychological or neuroscientific expert evidence to support a
defense of “not guilty” by reason of insanity.137 Researchers concluded that
136. In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick asks whether aliens that are
smarter than humans would be justified in treating humans the way we treat cows. See
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (2d prtg. 2013). Query the implications for
fetuses, persistent vegetative state (“PVS”) patients, and anencephalic babies.
137. See Nicholas J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, Neuroimage Evidence and the
Insanity Defense, 29 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 592, 594–95 (2011).
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“framing mental illness” in neurological terms “remove[s] some
skepticism on the part of jurors by making the underlying mechanism of
the mental illness more concrete.”138 Far more than psychological
evidence, the neuroscience convinced subjects that a defendant lacked
control over his otherwise criminal conduct.139
A second study presented participants with one of two different
descriptions for the same deterministic universe.140 One adopted explicitly
neuroscientific terms to describe how decisions for outcomes are made,
while the other used psychological terms that highlighted—in place of
brain activity—the role of thoughts and desires in decision-making for
those effects.141 88.6% of subjects in the psychology group agreed that
people could be held morally responsible, compared to just 40.7% of those
in the neuroscience group, a result that researchers attributed to
deterministic priming.142
The impact of such priming faces crucial limits, however. Another
recent study asked subjects to imagine a person wore a device that would
create pictures of his brain capable of predicting his every decision with
perfect accuracy.143 In some situations but not others, the device would let
his actions be manipulated by a scientist.144 It turns out that perfect
prediction by itself was not enough to erode perceptions of praise or blame.
Only when the predictive tool was accompanied by an outside actor’s
capacity to alter outcomes did subjects decline to attribute
responsibility.145 Similar studies bear out this conclusion.146 In the absence
of mind-control-like exploitation, exposure to imaging research tends to
feed exaggerated beliefs in determinism. These reduce ascriptions of
blame, but only modestly.
b.

Bypassing

Attributions of individual responsibility are characteristically
weaker, by contrast, if a person’s mental state is deprived of any causal
role in her actions. This is the challenge of preconscious bypassing that
138. Id. at 604.
139. Id.
140. See Eddy Nahmias et al., Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mechanism:
Experiments on Folk Intuitions, 31 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 214, 218 (2007).
141. See id. at 218.
142. Id. at 227, 232.
143. See Eddy Nahmias et al., It’s OK If ‘My Brain Made Me Do it’: People’s
Intuitions about Free Will and Neuroscientific Prediction, 133 COGNITION 502, 504 (2014).
144. See id. at 505.
145. See id. at 512–14.
146. See Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias, Explaining Away Incompatibilist
Intuitions, 88 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 434, 439 (2012); Dylan Murray & Tania
Lombrozo, Effects of Manipulation on Attributions of Causation, Free Will, and Moral
Responsibility, 41 COGNITIVE SCI. 447, 469 (2017).
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brain timing research poses. Studies like Libet’s suggest to the lay or
casual reader that the preconscious urges a person neither chooses nor
controls crowd out the conscious intentions he has in driving the decisions
he makes to take this action rather than that one.147 “If neural processes
completely explain our actions,” some take away from these experiments,
“then what causal work is left for our beliefs and desires to do?”148
It is not so hard to see how buying into bypassing might lead people
to question the general assumption that individuals are responsible for
their actions. Consider the following survey study: Half of all participants
read an excerpt that described the timing-based premise behind
bypassing—namely, what people experience as conscious intentions are
really just unconscious electrical signals within the brain.149 This group
was then asked to adjudicate a sentence for a hypothetical murderer. So
were the other half of subjects, except they read a different passage
instead.150 Those who read the brain-timing article advised average
sentences that were 50% shorter than did those who were not presented
with that neuroscience research.151 Similar results support the hypothesis
that laypeople’s confrontation with brain timing studies encourages a
belief in conscious bypassing at apparent odds with traditional
commitments to individual responsibility.152
2.

Beliefs about Essentialism

“Genetic essentialism” is the psychological driver linking exposure
to genomics research to perceptions of equality.153 Essentialism represents
the idea that groups are “natural kinds” whose members have basic

147. See infra Section III.A.2.
148. Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias, Neuroscience, Free Will, Folk
Intuitions, and the Criminal Law, 36 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 157, 171–72 (2011).
149. See Azim Shariff et al., Free Will and Punishment: A Mechanistic View of
Human Nature Reduces Retribution, 25 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1563, 1565 (2014) (citing FRANCIS
CRICK, THE ASTONISHING HYPOTHESIS: THE SCIENTIFIC SEARCH FOR THE SOUL 14 (1994)).
150. See id. at 1566.
151. See id. For a discussion of this research, see Gunnar Björnsson, Incompatibilism
and “Bypassed” Agency, in SURROUNDING FREE WILL: PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY,
NEUROSCIENCE 95, 115 (Alfred R. Mele ed., 2014).
152. See Eddy Nahmias & Dylan Murray, Experimental Philosophy on Free Will: An
Error Theory for Incompatibilist Intuitions, in NEW WAVES IN PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION 189,
207 (Jess Anguilar et al. eds., 2010); Andrew E. Monroe & Bertram F. Malle, From
Uncaused Will to Conscious Choice: The Need to Study, Not Speculate About People’s
Folk Concept of Free Will, 1 REV. PHIL. PSYCHOL. 211, 219–20 (2009); Eddy Nahmias,
Autonomous Agency and Social Psychology, in CARTOGRAPHIES OF THE MIND: PHILOSOPHY
AND PSYCHOLOGY IN INTERSECTION 169, 180 (Massimo Marraffa et al. eds., 2007); HoiYee Chan et al., Free Will and Experimental Philosophy, in A COMPANION TO
EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 158, 168 (Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter eds., 2016).
153. Ilan Dar-Nimrod & Steven J. Heine, Genetic Essentialism: On the Deceptive
Determinism of DNA, 137 PSYCHOL. BULL. 800, 808 (2011).
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“essences.”154 This idea casts members of a certain race, ethnicity, or
gender as sharing the sort of fixed and inborn characteristics that often
support stereotypes, prejudice, racism, or nationalism.155 Social
psychologists have distinguished two types of genetic essentialism:
biosomatic and biobehavioral.
a.

Biosomaticism

Biosomatic essentialism holds that membership in a group is
immutable, uniform, inherent and natural, and discrete as a function of
physical markers like height and skin color.156 Biobehavioral essentialism
goes beyond the physical to ascribe group members genetically inherited
behaviors.157 Lay confrontation with human genomics research about
physical differences reinforces the biosomatic essentialism that many in
modern American society already accept as true.158
This form of genetic essentialism holds that a person’s biological
essence as expressed through his physical characteristics does not change,
whatever his lived experience, group interaction, or self-identification.159
This helps to explain why, when subjects were asked to read evidence of
biologically-based physical differences among racial groups—rather than
evidence that race is uninformed by genetic differences—they were more
likely to endorse essentialism beliefs and to exhibit nearly 20% higher
levels of racial prejudice and negative stereotyping.160 After reading an
article that connected genetics to a greater risk of disease for members of
a racial group, those subjects were more likely to associate certain other

154. See Brock Bastian & Nick Haslam, Psychological Essentialism and Stereotype
Endorsement, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 228, 232 (2006).
155. Michael R. Andreychik & Michael J. Gill, Do Natural Kind Beliefs about Social
Groups Contribute to Prejudice?: Distinguishing Bio-somatic Essentialism from Biobehavioral Essentialism, and Both of these from Entitativity, 18 GROUP PROCESSES &
INTERGROUP REL. 454, 455 (2015).
156. See id. at 456.
157. Id. See also Michael J. Gill & Dana M. Mendes, When the Minority Thinks
“Essentially” Like the Majority: Blacks Distinguish Bio-Somatic from Bio-Behavioral
Essentialism in Their Conceptions of Whites, and Only the Latter Predicts Prejudice, 11
PLOS ONE 1, 13 (2016) (distinguishing biosomatic and biobehavioral essentialism).
158. See Brian M. Donovan, Framing the Genetics Curriculum for Social Justice: An
Experimental Exploration of How the Biology Curriculum Influences Beliefs About Racial
Difference, 100 SCI. EDUC. 586, 589 (2016).
159. See Francisco J. Gil-White, Are Ethnic Groups Biological “Species” to the
Human Brain?, 42 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 515, 523–25 (2001) (discussing a study
finding that Mongolian participants would still regard a child as “Kazakh” if his genetic
parents were Kazakh but he was adopted at birth by a Mongolian family, raised only by
Mongolians, and learned only Mongolian customs and language).
160. See Jo C. Phelan et al., The Genomic Revolution and Beliefs about Essential
Racial Differences: A Backdoor to Eugenics?, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 167, 173–75 (2013).
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limited traits of skill or personality with the “genetic makeup” of that
race.161
b.

Biobehavioralism

These specious associations are stronger and more prevalent in the
case of biobehavioral essentialism that links genetic differences directly to
traits like intelligence and temperament at the heart of mental group
differences research.162 Several studies have indicated that adherents of
biobehavioral essentialism show diminished engagement with racial
equality.163 One study presented subjects with a battery of questions on
beliefs in biosomatic and biobehavioral essentialism—for example: “The
primary reason why parents and children are so similar in their behavior,
personality, and character is that they share much of their DNA”; and
“Most of the physical traits in human beings can be traced back to their
genes”— before measuring their prejudice levels using the “Modern
Racism Scale.”164 Biosomatic essentialism barely correlated to prejudicial
views at just 0.20; the 0.66 correlation with biobehavioralism was more
than three times as predictive.165
Other studies of group essentialism and negative stereotyping have
arrived at similar indictments of biobehavioral beliefs over and above
biosomatic ones.166 More pernicious than perceiving groups as innate
kinds with physical differences, is thinking all their members “share the
‘seed’ of negative behaviors ‘deep down inside’ (even if not all members
are currently showing those bad behaviors).”167 This belief that genes
encode human identity, of course, reflects an inflated view of the way

161. See Alexandre Morin-Chassé, Public (Mis)understanding of News about
Behavioral Genetics Research: A Survey Experiment, 64 BIOSCIENCE 1170, 1177 (2014).
162. See Brian M. Donovan, Learned Inequality: Racial Labels in the Biology
Curriculum Can Affect the Development of Racial Prejudice, 54 J. RES. SCI. TEACHING 379,
382 (2016).
163. See Melissa J. Williams & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Biological Conceptions of
Race and the Motivation to Cross Racial Boundaries, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1033, 1041 (2008).
164. See Andreychik & Gill, supra note 155, at 461–63.
165. See id. at 463.
166. See Johannes Keller, In Genes We Trust: The Biological Component of
Psychological Essentialism and Its Relationship to Mechanisms of Motivated Social
Cognition, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 686, 689–90 (2005); see also Benjamin
Y. Cheung & Steven J. Heine, The Double-Edged Sword of Genetic Account of
Criminality: Causal Attributions From Genetic Ascriptions Affect Legal Decision Making,
41 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1723, 1736 (2015) (finding that genetic
explanations of criminal behavior reduce ascriptions of control, while increasing
perceptions of dangerousness).
167. See Andreychik & Gill, supra note155, at 466.
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genes contribute to people’s sense of self.168 And yet there is a widespread
perception that DNA imparts natural and immutable traits in a way that
makes it easy to see different individuals as belonging to discrete and
unvarying groups.169
3.

Education and Worldviews

Two other factors plausibly mediate reported beliefs about equality
and responsibility. The first is the extent to which people are conversant
in scientific facts and concepts that could impact their understanding of
and/or receptiveness to neuroscientific or genetic findings. The second is
the sort of ideologies that comprise cultural worldviews. Either might
inform reported beliefs about cherished ideals in ways that operate
independently of or in connection to beliefs about either mechanism or
essentialism.
a.

Scientific Literacy

The half of Americans who know the Earth takes a year to orbit the
Sun might be assumed to think differently about genetic or neuroscientific
information and its implications than those who mistakenly think that
Earth orbits in just a day.170 Those less conversant in scientific facts and
concepts might accordingly be presumed more deferential to scientific
authorities or less critical of unreliable findings.171 Their weaker basis for
independent appraisal or duly skeptical judgment might make them more
susceptible to accepting superficially credible implications of scientific
evidence that a more informed evaluation would not substantiate. On the
other hand, unfamiliarity with basic science may lead some to reject such
research as elite propaganda, leading them to resist scientific explanations
even more.

168. See Dov Fox, Silver Spoons and Golden Genes: Genetic Engineering and the
Egalitarian Ethos, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 567, 594–95 (2007).
169. See JOHN H. EVANS, WHAT IS A HUMAN? WHAT THE ANSWERS MEAN FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS 60–65 (2016); Jason Schnittker et al., Nature, Nurture, Neither, Nor: Black-White
Differences in Beliefs about the Causes and Appropriate Treatment of Mental Illness, 78
SOC. FORCES 1101, 1132 (2000). See also Boby Ho-Hong Ching & Jason Teng Xu, The
Effects of Gender Neuroessentialism on Transprejudice: An Experimental Study, 78 SEX
ROLES 228, 230 (2018) (identifying essentialist beliefs about purported differences
between men and women as a major source of prejudice against transgendered individuals).
170. Nat’l Sci. Bd., Science & Engineering Indicators 2016, NSF.GOV,
https://bit.ly/2CLtCJk (last visited July 18, 2019).
171. See Dominique Brossard & Matthew C. Nisbet, Deference to Scientific
Authority Among a Low Information Public: Understanding U.S. Opinion on Agricultural
Biotechnology, 19 INT’L J. PUB. OP. RES. 24, 45–47 (2007) (finding that scientific
knowledge plays a modest role on deference to scientific authorities in the context of
research related to agricultural biotechnology).
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Cultural Worldviews

Another factor plausibly complicates the effect that subversive
science has on attitudes about equality and responsibility: namely, diverse
visions about what makes society good. New findings can offer evidence
either for or against these rival visions.172 Those visions may be informed
by factors like race, gender, age, geography, education, religion,
personality, or political affiliation.173 For example, those inclined to a
hierarchical rather than egalitarian outlook might be suspicious of genetics
research purporting to show that individuals from all groups are
meaningfully similar. One might likewise expect those who hold
communitarian as opposed to individualist values to sense that brain
research only validates whatever existing doubts, they have that adults of
sound mind are morally responsible for their behaviors and should be held
legally so in the absence of justification or excuse. Past studies suggest
that cultural beliefs about morally-laden values, such as responsibility and
equality, motivate reasoning about related facts.174
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
These data call for steps designed to help social institutions produce
and disseminate knowledge more effectively.175 My analysis reframes the
threat that controversial lines of inquiry present in terms of actual
perceptions rather than abstract conceptions. This reframing, in turn,
advises targeting the communication of knowledge instead of its
production. Therefore, I reject direct government or university restrictions
on research in lieu of evidence-based approaches to public engagement
and science communication. These strategies must be deployed to combat
not just alternative facts, but also cognitive biases from biogenetic
essentialisms to neuroscientific determinism or bypassing. This Part
identifies and analyzes the chief reason that the government has for
regulating subversive science of the kind I studied here. I argue that this
reason—the state’s interest in preserving secular democratic ideals—is
wholly legitimate, albeit insufficiently forceful, to justify any of the direct
or intrusive research restrictions that I specify here.
172. See generally MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN
ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS (1983)
(explaining political conflict as a struggle between adherents of competing approaches to
ideals of egalitarianism and individualism).
173. See Dan M. Kahan, Cultural Cognition as a Conception of the Cultural Theory
of Risk, in HANDBOOK OF RISK THEORY 725, 746 (Sabine Roeser et al. eds, 2012).
174. See JONATHAN L. GROSS & STEVE RAYNER, MEASURING CULTURE: A PARADIGM
FOR THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 6 (1985).
175. See generally Elizabeth Anderson, The Epistemology of Democracy, 3 EPISTEME
8–22 (2006) (introducing and developing the concept of “institutional epistemology”).
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Research Regulation

Direct regulation by the scientific profession could take form in
informal norms or formal codes of conduct that societies, agencies, review
boards, funding foundations, or journals set forth to limit what is funded,
permitted, or published.176 The problem is that no professional paradigm
could justify the kind of self-regulation that would respond to the risk of
subversiveness.177 The consent model, for instance, derives duties from
scientists having chosen to enter their profession—but nothing about that
voluntary entrance decision implies any commitment to democratic
ideals.178 No more promising is the gatekeeper model of public dependence
on access to scientific progress—it affords no resources to bootstrap a
concern for subversion.179 Both suggest an emphasis on three dimensions
of research: funding, free speech, and public morals.
1.

Funding

Government funding is another way to regulate costly scientific
research that requires state or federal support if private sources cannot
provide enough. Funding decisions provide regulatory control. Yet the
government has no obligation to subsidize even the most worthy and
promising lines of research; indeed, it has no duty to fund science at all.
The state must fund only constitutionally mandated activities and
institutions like elections, federal courts, and national defense. The
political process allots all other funding through deliberation and dealmaking.180 A growing school of scientific researchers, that a recent New
York Times profile referred to as the “intellectual dark web,” fear that their
pursuit of controversial lines of inquiry will not only cut off their public
funding but may even get them fired.181
The government weighs in on the relative worthiness of various
pursuits whenever it funds some projects over others. In the scientific
research context, consider President George W. Bush’s policy restricting
176. See The Editorial Board, Should Scientists Toy With the Secret of Life?, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2Jr4ZZW.
177. See Harvey Brooks, Lessons of History: Successive Challenges to Science
Policy, in THE RESEARCH SYSTEM IN TRANSITION, 11, 12 (Susan E. Cozzens et al. eds.,
1990).
178. See Norbert Elias, Scientific Establishments, in SCIENTIFIC ESTABLISHMENTS
AND HIERARCHIES 3, 42-49 (Norbert Elias et al. eds., 2012).
179. Daryl Chubin & Terence Connolly, Research Trails and Science Policies: Local
and Extra-Local Negotiation of Scientific Work, in SCIENTIFIC ESTABLISHMENTS AND
HIERARCHIES 293, 301 (Norbert Elias et al. eds., 2012).
180. Peter Berkowitz, The Meaning of Federal Funding (President’s Council on
Bioethics, unpublished working paper), https://bit.ly/2Wsa5uK.
181. See Bari Weiss, Meet the Renegades of the Intellectual Dark Web, N.Y. TIMES
(May 8, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2IrkbW4.
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federal funding for any stem cell research involving the destruction of live
embryos.182 That policy still allowed the federal government to fund
existing stem cell lines using embryos that had already been destroyed, as
well as state or private funding to create new cell lines.183 The political
right decried the policy as unprincipled—If life has absolute worth, then
all embryo research must stop!184 The left lambasted it as sectarian—Lifesaving therapies cannot be forsaken for the sake of eight-cell organisms!185
But neither side could rightly complain that the policy violated any
entitlement to state funding for certain kinds of projects over others.186
2.

Free Speech

Modern democracies operate under a presumption that government
should not interfere with the content of scientific inquiry.187 Scholars have
long defended an asserted right of scientific speech to be free from state
interference in deciding what and how to study, teach, or publish.188 This
is not a demand for resources or facilities to advance knowledge, but a
protection against its active suppression.189 Proponents have sought to
justify this right as an element of academic freedom, a precondition for
free and open expression, or a form of expressive conduct.190 What makes
science a matter of constitutional concern is its distinctive status—like art
182. See George W. Bush, Stem Cell Science and the Preservation of Life, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 12, 2001), https://nyti.ms/2MzTPV8.
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., Leon R. Kass, The Meaning of Life–In the Laboratory, AEI (Jan. 1,
2002), https://bit.ly/2KkGA7P.
185. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Religious Rights and Wrongs, CHI. TRIB., July 26,
2006, at 27.
186. Lee Zwanziger, Roots and Branches of the US National Debate on Human
Embryonic Stem Cell Research, in FUNDAMENTALS OF THE STEM CELL DEBATE 108, 133
(K.R. Monroe ed., 2008).
187. STEVEN GOLDBERG, CULTURE CLASH: LAW AND SCIENCE IN AMERICA 11 (1994).
A directive issued by President Reagan, and endorsed by every administration since,
affirms federal policy that “to the maximum extent possible the products of fundamental
research [shall] remain unrestricted.” National Security Decision Directive 189, NATIONAL
POLICY ON THE TRANSFER OF SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL AND ENGINEERING INFORMATION
(Sept. 21, 1985), https://bit.ly/2WFS24r.
188. See, e.g., Richard G. Berger, Government Regulation of the Pursuit of
Knowledge: The Recombinant DNA Controversy, 3 VT. L. REV. 83 (1978); Richard
Delgado & D.R. Millen, God, Galileo, and Government: Toward Constitutional Protection
for Scientific Inquiry, 53 WASH. L. REV. 349 (1977); John A. Robertson, The Scientist’s
Right to Research: A Constitutional Analysis, 51 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1203 (1978).
189. Natalie Ram, Science as Speech, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1187, 1208 (2017).
190. See generally Richard Delgado, Can Science Be Inopportune?, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 128 (1983); James R. Ferguson, Scientific Inquiry and the First Amendment, 64
CORNELL L. REV. 639 (1979); Steve Keane, The Case Against Blanket First Amendment
Protection of Scientific Research: Articulating a More Limited Scope of Protection, 59
STAN. L. REV. 505 (2006); Barry McDonald, Government Regulation or Other
“Abridgements” of Scientific Research, 54 EMORY L.J. 989 (2005).
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or philosophy—as a vital way in which citizens produce new knowledge.
The validity of restrictions depends on “the strength of relevant state
interests.”191
Subversive science does not endanger tangible interests such as
public health or national security; it does not deprive research subjects of
informed consent or cause them avoidable pain or suffering.192 Neither
genetics nor neuroscience research can discredit the theoretical
foundations of cherished ideals like responsibility and equality. This is so
even as people’s exposure to new discoveries may nevertheless lead them
to doubt those ideals in just this way. Timing research does not “destroy
our capacity to function as moral agents” any more than the discovery of
genetically affected group differences would destroy our understanding of
people as moral equals who share the same worth and dignity as others.193
The threat that these lines of inquiry present is how susceptible they are to
being misunderstood as showing that people lack free will or equal worth.
3.

Public Morals

Constitutional and practical problems beset legal restrictions on
science to preserve those same democratic ideals that its dissemination
threatens to subvert.194 Responsibility and equality are less concrete at the
level of values than public goods of safety or welfare, despite questions
about definitions and measurement. State concern for the intangible norms
is nonetheless rational, indeed imperative, given their centrality to the
effective functioning of political institutions.195 And their preservation
violates no constitutional decree. Affirming those ideals neither singles out
protected classes, for example, nor takes sides on religion. Yet it is far
from clear that this interest in secular ideals central to democratic culture
is strong enough to support direct or onerous restrictions on subversive
science.
The Supreme Court raised questions about the government’s
authority to legislate morality in a very different context when it struck
down a ban on gay sodomy in Lawrence v. Texas.196 Justice Kennedy held
for the majority that moral disapproval of homosexuality failed to justify
a prohibition on private consensual conduct.197 The Court’s holding left
unclear, however, how broadly its skepticism about the public morality

191. Robert Post, Constitutional Restraints on the Regulations of Scientific Speech
and Scientific Research, 15 SCI. & ENG’G ETHICS 432, 432 (2009).
192. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
193. RESCHER, supra note 2, at 9.
194. See Dov Fox, Interest Creep, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 303–11 (2014).
195. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
196. 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003).
197. Id. at 585 (citation omitted).
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interest applies. Does it apply narrowly, only to values that demean
unpopular groups, as Justice O’Connor suggested in her concurrence?198
Or does it sweep so broadly that, as Justice Scalia lamented in his dissent,
Lawrence “effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation[?]”199
Whichever interpretation prevails, the state’s interest in sustaining public
perceptions of responsibility and equality is, at any rate, too weak to justify
restrictions on subversive science.200
Even if it were constitutional for the government to force researchers
to look here rather than there, such limits would make for bad policy. First,
who can predict the effects of restricting research? As explained by
psychologist Chris Chabris, restrictions designed to be narrow can still
“distort[] researchers’ priorities and can harm the understanding of related
topics” when their foreseeable spillover on shared proofs and methods
“causes mistakes in other areas as well.”201 The second casualty of research
restrictions is the organic serendipity that characterizes many crucial
scientific discoveries, ranging from X-rays to recent innovations in cutand-splice DNA.202 The government should be thus wary of interfering
with the direction that scientific research takes, any more than its grant
funding power already does. Non-state institutions also promote or
constrain research by awarding or denying grants, promotions, speaking
requests, and publication offers. The next section explains.
B.

Public Engagement

The scientists who produce knowledge, the journalists who transmit
it to the public, and the legislators and judges who integrate it into law all

198. See id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
199. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Uncertainty about the status of morals
legislation has played out in the post-Lawrence circuit split over the constitutionality of
laws that ban the sale of sex toys to deter “the pursuit of sexual gratification unrelated to
procreation.” Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 745 (5th Cir. 2008). The
Eleventh Circuit upheld a ban on the ground that “public morality remains a legitimate
rational basis for the challenged legislation even after Lawrence.” Williams v. Morgan, 478
F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2007). The Fifth Circuit struck a ban down, by contrast,
suggesting that to do otherwise “would be to ignore the holding in Lawrence” that
regulation cannot be justified “simply by deeming [a practice] morally offensive.” Reliable
Consultants, 517 U.S. 738 at 745; Manuel Possolo, Morals Legislation After Lawrence
Can States Criminalize the Sale of Sexual Devices?, 65 STAN. L. REV. 565, 580–89 (2013).
200. Robert F. Nagel, Unfocused Governmental Interests, 55 ALB. L. REV. 573, 573,
580 (1992).
201. Hayden, supra note 12, at 27. See, Rescuing Science from Politics: Regulation
and the Distortion of Scientific Research 84–99 (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds.,
2006).
202. See generally ROYSTON M. ROBERTS, SERENDIPITY: ACCIDENTAL DISCOVERIES
IN SCIENCE (1989).
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have crucial roles in managing risks of subversive science.203 Scientists are
rarely equipped to answer the moral or religious questions raised by their
research.204 The ethics of stem cell research or gene editing, for example,
turn on how we value embryos—between persons and property—and
whether or why the natural lottery matters.205 Non-scientists cannot avoid
navigating these matters for themselves. What Judge Richard Posner has
called the “fear and loathing”206 that Americans show to science should
not lead us to write off its more contentious expressions as “inaccessible
to popular comprehension and uncontrollable by democratic decisionmaking.”207 To facilitate constructive public engagement, I recommend a
combination of research incentives, communication, and framing.
1.

Incentives

Many think scientists should stick to research and leave specialized
reporters to translate and transmit their results and implications.208
Scientists themselves, however, will remain in demand to give media
interviews, testify in courts and before Congress, and address local
community forums.209 However, modern graduate education fails to
prepare scientific researchers to explain their work and its relevance to
non-academic audiences. For basic and applied research, universities train
scientists to focus on narrow questions within a much larger puzzle, all
while reporting the facts and data that they study and interpret in the
technical language and media of their discipline.
Ph.D. students go on to run their own labs without having learned
how to explain why their work matters or how to convey that meaning or
significance to audiences of laypeople. Yet a team of Carnegie Mellon
scientists recognized that the ability to message effectively requires special
training before research falls under public scrutiny.210 And once science

203. See Kathleen H. Jamieson & Bruce W. Hardy, Leveraging Scientific Credibility
about Arctic Sea Ice Trends in a Polarized Political Environment, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD.
SCI. 13598, 13605 (2014).
204. See Susan Haack, Of Truth, in Science and in Law, 73 BROOKLYN L. REV. 985,
986–87 (2008).
205. See Dov Fox, Retracing Liberalism and Remaking Nature: Designer Children,
Research Embyos, and Featherless Chickens, 24 BIOETHICS 170, 173 (2010).
206. Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 2013).
207. Bruce Bimber & David H. Guston, Politics by the Same Means: Government
and Science in the United States, in HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES
554, 559 (Shelia Jasanoff et al. eds., 1st ed., 1995).
208. Earle Holland et al., The Risks and Advantages of Framing Science, 317 SCI.
1168, 1171 (2007).
209. See Anita Makri, Give the Public the Tools to Trust Scientists, 541 NATURE 261,
233 (2017).
210. MELISSA D. CLARKSON ET AL., THE ENGAGE PROGRAM 31-32 (Tyler D. Robinson
ed., 2012), available at http://bit.ly/2YEmh9a.
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graduates go on to run their own professional labs, decisions about grants,
prizes, publication, promotion, and tenure almost never reward such
participation in science festivals, public debates, science-art
collaborations, and other citizen-science enterprises.211
Most scientists lack the background, talent, or incentive to translate
the significance and limits of their research for non-scientists in light of its
wider implications.212 Institutions that employ or fund scientists should
provide training programs to help them translate findings more clearly and
effectively for a general audience.213 Programs might include professional
meetings, online modules, and internship or residency programs to teach
researchers to brief their work using “legislator-derived, value-based
criteria to evaluate each option and produce a final recommendation.”214
Modules in neuroscience and genetics, in particular, might focus on the
subversive dimensions of research.
2.

Communication

Research funders should also encourage and expect scientists to
develop plans for public communication and outreach. For example, the
National Science Foundation requires applicants who engage in basic
research across disciplines, including genetics and neuroscience, to
include in any proposal an impact review that answers questions like:
“Will results be disseminated broadly to enhance scientific and
technological understanding?” and “What may be the benefits of the
proposed activity to society?”215 Now is the time for scientific institutions
and organizations to make science communication a priority. Doing so
could involve promotional incentives, leave time, and social recognition
that rewards public lectures, media work, and development of training
activities. Compensation metrics could, for instance, integrate audience
size, reach, evaluations, and other proxy measures of impact and
excellence in the communication of subversive science.216
This culture of science communication should supplement the
training of researchers and reporters skilled in and dedicated to the craft of
211. See Clare Matterson, Scientists’ Public Engagement Work Should Be
Generously Funded, GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2013, 8:17 P.M.), https://bit.ly/2W9qdBw.
212. See Ploy Achakulwisut, Why Are Scientists So Averse to Public Engagement?,
SCIENTIFIC AM. GUEST BLOG (Mar. 8, 2017), https://bit.ly/2JttgOI.
213. See Mónica I. Feliú-Mójer, Effective Communication, Better Science,
SCIENTIFIC AM. GUEST BLOG (Feb. 24, 2015), https://bit.ly/2cL2LnW.
214. See Shikhar H. Shah et al., Systems-Based Training in Graduate Medical
Education for Service Learning in the State Legislature in the United States: Pilot Study,
JMIR MED. EDUC., Oct. 2017, at 1, 3.
215. Peter March, Broader Impacts Review Criterion, NAT’L. SCI. FOUND.,
https://bit.ly/2HA3BR7 (last visited July 18, 2019).
216. See Judy Illes et al., Neurotalk: Improving the Communication of Neuroscience
Research, 11 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE, 61, 64 (2010).
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transmitting (subversive) science between the scientists who produce
knowledge and the non-scientists who consume it.217 Knowledge brokers,
such as science journalists, build networks and exchange information in
contextualized, respectful, and intelligible ways among practitioners,
policymakers, and citizens. They must receive training in genetics and
neuroscience alongside an appreciation of their larger implications,
associated biases, and corrective framings.218 To train knowledge brokers,
academic and media institutions should identify promising candidates
based on their interest and critical thinking. Second, these institutions
should develop programs to train these recruits to examine, synthesize,
filter, and adapt subversive science across a range of media to reach
diverse audiences.219
3.

Framing

Potentially biasing information does not come with a warning label.
Effective warnings about the pull of mechanistic or essentialist biases can
disrupt exaggerated expectations by inducing a temporary state of
skepticism that prompts consideration of the research and its implications
with a more critical or discriminating eye.220 Social psychology research
on these warnings suggests that, to be effective, they must explain the
specific ways in which these biases operate as people process
neuroscience, genomics, and other research that carries the power to
disrupt cherished ideals.221
One crucial place to combat the misperception of subversive science
is in the courtroom. Trial judges always issue instructions to jurors in
criminal cases—to deliberate only after all of the evidence has been
presented, for example, and to make a decision based only on that
evidence.222 Judges may also instruct jurors to disregard or scrutinize some

217. Alex T. Bielak et al., From Science Communication to Knowledge Brokering:
The Shift from ‘Science Push’ to ‘Policy Pull’, in COMMUNICATING SCIENCE IN SOCIAL
CONTEXTS 201, 226 (Donghong Cheng et al. eds., 2008).
218. See Maureen Dobbins et al., A description of a knowledge broker role
implemented as part of a randomized controlled trial evaluating three knowledge
translation strategies, IMPLEMENTATION SCI., Apr. 27, 2009, at 1, 7.
219. See Morgan Meyer, The Rise of the Knowledge Broker, 32 SCI. COMM. 118, 127
(2010).
220. See Karen L. Chambers & Maria S. Zaragoza, Intended and unintended effects
of explicit warnings on eyewitness suggestibility: Evidence from source identification tests,
29 MEMORY & COGNITION 1120, 1129 (2001).
221. See Yaacov Schul, When Warning Succeeds: The Effect of Warning on Success
in Ignoring Invalid Information, 29 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 42, 60–62 (1993).
222. See Blake M. McKimmie et al., Objective and Subjective Comprehension of Jury
Instructions in Criminal Trials, 17 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 163, 164–66 (2014).
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evidence.223 When expert facts and opinion testimony impart subversive
science in court, judges should at least caution jurors to critically appraise
its weight and reliability and warn them of proven limits.224 Judges could
inform jurors that neuroscience research, for instance, shows which parts
of the brain are active when one person or another is performing a
particular task, clarifying that neither timing nor imaging studies can
determine any specific cause of individual thoughts or actions.225 Judges
must take special care not to lead jurors astray. But they can and should
make them aware of those biases, like determinism or bypassing, that
exposure to such evidence commonly invites.226
Cautionary instructions will not be enough to contain the risk that
some subversive science poses in the courtroom. The rules that govern
scientific expert evidence bar testimony that is invalid, irrelevant, or
unduly misleading.227 Expert analysis of a brain scan or neuroimaging or
timing studies must, to be admissibly relevant, “reliably apply the
principles and methods” of “specialized knowledge” in a way that tends to
make some fact “of consequence in determining the action . . . more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.”228 Even relevant
evidence is excluded if it is far less probative of that consequential matter
than it is confusing or prejudicial.229 Are brain-imaging or timing studies
relevant to the conditions required for criminal responsibility? And does
testimony about that research provide markedly less to prove that fact than
it does to prejudice jurors?230
Brain images can relate directly to a subject’s head injury, and
indirectly to certain facts related to mental states or conditions like
knowledge or psychosis. And studies suggest that evidence like this does
not tend to bias or misinform.231 But is neuroscience relevant to and
223. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE Standard 6-2.6(b) (3d ed. 2000),
available at https://bit.ly/2WhFktu.
224. Edward Imwinkelried, Impoverishing the Trier of Fact: Excluding Proponent’s
Expert Testimony Due to the Opponent’s Inability to Afford Rebuttal Evidence, 40 CONN.
L. REV. 317, 350 (2007).
225. See Jane Campbell Moriarty & Michael J. Saks, Forensic Science: Grand Goals,
Tragic Flaws, and Judicial Gatekeeping, JUDGES’ J., Fall 2006, at 16, 31.
226. See James M. Doyle, Applying Lawyers’ Expertise to Scientific Experts: Some
Thoughts About Trial Court Analysis of the Prejudicial Effects of Admitting and Excluding
Expert Scientific Testimony, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 619, 636–40 (1984).
227. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
228. FED. R. EVID. 702; FED. R. EVID. 401.
229. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
230. See Stephen J. Morse, Brain Imaging in the Courtroom: The Quest for Legal
Relevance, AJOB NEUROSCIENCE, Mar. 18, 2014, at 24, 26–27.
231. See Adina L. Roskies et al., Neuroimages in court: less biasing than feared, 17
TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 99, 101 (2011); see also N.J. Schweitzer et al., Neuroimages as
evidence in a mens rea defense: No Impact, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 357, 372 (2011).
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probative of basic responsibility? Recall that timing and imaging research
measures brain activity while a subject performs an experimental task that
bears little resemblance to what any defendant is alleged to have done.232
Indeed, even individual “causation by a brain abnormality” will be hardpressed to “remove criminal responsibility” in the absence of available
facts about control of the particular defendant’s behavior at the time of the
crime.233 Proving relevance to matters of criminal responsibility will be
trying.
Publications that control the dissemination of subversive science also
have a role to play in helping ordinary people appreciate the facts and
concepts that underlie it. Those who transmit this knowledge in peerreviewed journals or popular media should avoid decontextualized
coverage or sensationalist headlines. These oversimplify the complex
causes of behavior or overstate the ability of technology to image the brain
or decode the genome. But scientists and science writers can and should
do more than that to communicate potentially subversive science in a way
that is sensitive to the values it implicates.234
For now, journals could require lay summaries like the warnings
advised above to accompany the publication of unruly research in
neuroscience and genomics.235 Such summaries might include similar
caveats that findings need not be taken to prove that traits are hard-wired
or that free will is an illusion. Making warnings measured will help guard
against their backfiring and priming people to cling to misperceptions
more tenaciously.236 Similarly, framing behavioral genetics through the
lens of individuals rather than groups, and framing neuroscientific findings
in terms of contributions instead of causes, can diffuse culturally driven
impulses to read too much into this research.237
IV. CONCLUSION
How can subversive science attend to threats of legal instability,
cultural turmoil, and political unrest without being shackled by fear,

232. See supra notes 66–75, 85–91 and accompanying text.
233. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong et al., Brain Images as Legal Evidence, 5 EPISTEME
359, 367 (2008).
234. See Thomas Dietz, Bringing Values and Deliberation to Science
Communication, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 14081, 14087 (2013).
235. See Lauren M. Kuehne & Julian D. Olden, Opinion: Lay Summaries Needed to
Enhance Science Communication, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3585, 3586 (2015).
236. See Claartje J. Vinkenburg, Engaging Gatekeepers, Optimizing Decision
Making, and Mitigating Bias: Design Specifications for Systemic Diversity Interventions,
53 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 212, 234 (2017).
237. Cliodhna O’Connor & Helene Joffe, How Has Neuroscience Affected Lay
Understandings of Personhood? A Review of the Evidence, 22 PUB. UNDERSTANDING SCI.
254, 266 (2013).
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dogma, or cynicism? I began by asking whether there are truths too
disturbing or divisive to pursue or reveal. Controversy about subversive
science has long revolved around supposed threats that certain research
findings pose to abstract understandings of cherished ideals. This Article
has proposed reorienting the debate toward concern for the public
commitment to those ideals. This move shifts away from philosophical
conceptions to psychological perceptions. Scientific research that does not
endanger abstract conceptions of democratic ideals can still risk actual
perceptions of them. And these real-world consequences are what matter
most for law and policy.

